

UNITY OF ACTION THROUGH A WHOLE OF SOCIETY APPROACH

BY

COLONEL CHRISTOPHER G. HALL
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2011

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 16-03-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Unity of Action Through A Whole of Society Approach				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Christopher G. Hall				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Mr. P. Kevin Dixon USAWC SGS				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle. PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT <p>The nature of the contemporary Joint Operational Environment (JOE) and likely projected futures present U.S. Joint Forces with considerable strategic planning and resourcing challenges. These challenges combined with pressure for smaller defense budgets will require integrated whole of government planning and execution and demand significant resource innovation to effectively meet existing and emerging threats.</p> <p>Peace building activities play a decisive role in the long term efforts to stabilize and build governance capacity in failed and failing states. This combined with a transition from contingency based panning to conflict prevention planning reinforces the need for an integrated approach leveraging unique complimentary non military organizations.</p> <p>This study examines the roll of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), as a strategic partner and offers the whole of society approach for harmonizing their unique contributions to achieve unity of action in strategic planning and execution.</p>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Civil Society Organization, Unity of Action, Peacebuilding					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: Unclassified			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 30	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

UNITY OF ACTION THROUGH A WHOLE OF SOCIETY APPROACH

by

Colonel Christopher G. Hall
United States Army

Mr. P. Kevin Dixon
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Christopher G. Hall
TITLE: Unity of Action Through a Whole of Society Approach
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 16 March 2011 WORD COUNT: 6,069 PAGES: 30
KEY TERMS: Civil Society Organization, Unity of Action, Peacebuilding
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The nature of the contemporary Joint Operational Environment (JOE) and likely projected futures present U.S. Joint Forces with considerable strategic planning and resourcing challenges. These challenges combined with pressure for smaller defense budgets will require integrated whole of government planning and execution and demand significant resource innovation to effectively meet existing and emerging threats.

Peace building activities play a decisive role in the long term efforts to stabilize and build governance capacity in failed and failing states. This combined with a transition from contingency based planning to conflict prevention planning reinforces the need for an integrated approach leveraging unique complimentary non military organizations.

This study examines the roll of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), as a strategic partner and offers the whole of society approach for harmonizing their unique contributions to achieve unity of action in strategic planning and execution.

UNITY OF ACTION THROUGH A WHOLE OF SOCIETY APPROACH

In Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, one of the most important lessons...relearned is that military success is not sufficient...These so-called soft capabilities along with military power are indispensable to any lasting success, indeed, to victory itself as Clausewitz understood it, which is achieving a political objective.¹

— Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense

Protecting our national interests and achieving a better peace are two foundational precepts of United States foreign policy. The US Joint Forces Command *2010 Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* states, “The next quarter century will challenge U.S. joint forces with threats and opportunities ranging from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to cooperative engagement in the global commons.”² This projection presents significant strategic planning and resourcing challenges to the U.S. military in support of these basic national policy ends. “In this environment, the presence, reach, and capability of U.S. military forces working with like-minded partners, will continue to be called upon to protect our national interests.”³ Harmonizing like minded complementary partners to achieve unity of action is the focus of this study.

This study examines the roll of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), as a complementary strategic partner and offers a “reasonable” approach for harmonizing their efforts with Theater Strategic Campaign Planning and execution. Supporting research is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the emerging factors reinforcing the need for more serious consideration of Civil Society Organization contributions. The second section discusses CSOs as a complementary resource and includes select examination of CSO historical background to include their peace

building role and relationship considerations. The third section discusses the whole of society approach and actions to aid in harmonizing military planning and operations with the complementary efforts of CSOs. Finally the conclusion illustrates why considering the role of CSO complementary efforts in meeting strategic policy goals is of significant value to Department of Defense (DoD).

Environment

Today's strategic environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA) requires a new approach to strategy. Susan Rice of the Brookings Institute reinforces this point:

A new U.S strategy should combine improved intelligence collection with more aggressive efforts at conflict resolution and post-conflict "nation building" in global crisis zones. Creating pockets of improved development and security would help limit the operating space of international outlaws. To this end, the United States must go beyond focusing on foreign assistance on recipients that are high-performing or reforming states. Instead, the United States should devise innovative ways to assist failed and failing states through targeted development and counter-terrorism assistance as well as improved trade access to the U.S. market.⁴

Increasing DoD ability to achieve greater unified action with Civil Society Organizations through a whole of society approach is an innovative way to enable this strategy. Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States of America*, provides the directive for unity of action and unity of effort. "Unified action includes a wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with OGAs, IGOs, and coordination with NGOs and the private sector) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or JTFs to achieve unity of effort."⁵ The current and foreseeable future offers a number of challenges and opportunities relevant to the discussion of pursuing unified action with Civil Society Organizations. Viewing CSO contributions and

the importance of achieving unity of action through the prism of the current environment is the subject of the next section.

The future presents internal and external challenges and opportunities for strategic leaders. An asymmetric and persistent threat of terrorism bred in environments of instability will tax decreasing USG resources and drive a more innovation approach to policy and strategy execution. These factors coupled with trends in U.S. national security policy, Army doctrine, and a new “design” based approach to planning provide an increased utility in aggressively seeking Civil Society Organizations as a complementary strategic partner.

Externally, the primary challenge is countering the emergence of non-state extremist ideology, terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation and their relation to failed or failing states. Internally, DoD faces the challenge of operating with a smaller budget that will require hard decisions to match forces structure with requirements.

Opportunities for attaining greater unity of action with CSOs are enhanced by a new strategic planning construct and inclusive national level security strategy. The Department of Defense now employs an adaptive planning construct that focuses strategic planning at the regional level in a comprehensive Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) designed to link all activities in an effort to shape conflict prevention as the primary effort. This new planning construct is a sharp departure from the contingency driven planning of the past. Additionally, the most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes peace building as a key pillar of U.S. foreign policy implementation. Together, these changes in the strategic environment, military strategic planning

practices, and U.S. national level policy compel DoD planners to consider the unique contributions of Civil Society Organizations. A more detailed examination of these changes illustrates the increasing relevance of CSOs and their potential as a complementary strategic partner.

As stated in the National Security Strategy, the linkage of failed or failing states to the spread of extremist ideology, terrorism and their potential access to WMD constitutes a growing threat to the security of the United States.

Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens' basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people. To advance our common security, we must address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing common challenges.⁶

Weak and or failing states provide a fertile environment for extremist groups and militias to recruit, train and execute terrorist activities regionally or globally. "Because these organizations do not operate within the international diplomatic systems, they will locate bases of operations in the noise and complexity of cities and use international law and the safe havens along borders or weak states to shield their operations and dissuade the U.S. from engaging them militarily."⁷ Furthermore and most disturbing "is the likelihood, that some of these groups will achieve a WMD capability through shared knowledge, through smuggling, or through the deliberate design of an unscrupulous state."⁸ This scenario presents a critical vulnerability to the United States government, which it must account for in strategic planning and deterrence policy.

Many of the capabilities required to counter such threats are not resident within DoD and would require considerable budget investment to generate. Development and

capacity building missions require a wide array of specialized capabilities and a long term commitment for success. Balancing limited resources and building the right force structure is a growing challenge. A recent quote from Secretary Gates reinforces this point:

In each instance we must ask: First, is this respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal duress? And second, is this activity or arrangement the best use of limited dollars, given the pressing needs to take care of our people, win the wars we are in, and invest in the capabilities necessary to deal with the most likely and lethal future threats?⁹

Proposed cuts in federal spending and subsequent decreases in defense budgets further underscores the need to pursue unity of action with Civil Society Organizations by harmonizing their complementary efforts in peace building.

A shift from military contingency based planning to holistic design based Theater Strategic Campaign Planning offers an opportunity to achieve greater unity of action with Civil Society Organizations. This emerging change is further emphasized in the latest U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Operations *Insights and Best Practices* publication which states, “This focus on design is a key responsibility of the theater-strategic and operational level commander. Another key responsibility is in the subsequent “socialization” of the paradigm/design with the many stakeholders to gain their buy in of the way ahead”¹⁰ In the current strategic and operational environment, Civil Society Organizations are a key stakeholder group to be considered in the theater strategic design process. As such, military planners need to understand CSO complementary actions, limitations and concerns through dedicated collaboration in the design process. Failure to listen can result in flawed design. “U.S. Government Agencies (USGs) should not assume they know what the problem is or that they

completely understand local dynamics.”¹¹ Without an appropriate mechanism for non-threatening dialog we lose the valuable insight of CSOs. They can and should be included in the theater campaign design process to harmonize complementary efforts enabling greater unity of action across the full range of resources available to the theater commander.

Shaping conditions and preventing wars are essential pillars of national strategy and Civil Society Organizations are a key contributor to this effort. A brief examination of the National Security Strategy (NSS) highlights the vital contribution of CSOs and the need for unified action.

National level policy clearly recognizes both the need for and challenges of enhancing development capabilities and collaboration between the uniformed services or other U.S. Government Agencies and CSOs. As stated in the 2010 NSS, “We have already begun to reorient and strengthen our development agenda; to take stock of and enhance our capabilities; and to forge new and more effective means of applying the skills of our military, diplomats, and development experts.”¹² The vital component is the integration of military, other interagency partners and “development experts” or CSOs. The 2011 National Military Strategy calls for a “full spectrum of direct and indirect leadership approaches [as] facilitator, enabler, convener, and guarantor”¹³. And as such, “we must play a supporting role in facilitating U.S. government agencies and other organizations’ efforts to advance our Nation’s interests”¹⁴. Developing an approach that supports the mutually beneficial application of military, diplomatic and development skills and capabilities must include nontraditional actors such as Civil Society Organizations. The implications of this strategy for the joint force are significant and

demand an inventive approach to force structure development and resource allocation that considers all existing and emerging resources. The Army, in particular, must carefully study and implement steps to optimize force structure for full spectrum operations.

Gaining greater unity of action with Civil Society Organizations deserves serious consideration when evaluating emerging Army doctrine and force structure. In a July 2010 interview, TRADOC Commander General Martin Dempsey further emphasizes with, “We now realize that we have to perform these two very important roles for the nation, depending on what we’re asked to do. One is wide area security; the other is combined arms maneuver. And from that cascades a whole bunch of things.”¹⁵ To accomplish these missions the Army must be able to employ defeat and stability mechanisms. Specifically, the Army Capstone Concept refers to four stability mechanisms, compel, control, influence, and support. Of these mechanisms, influence and support present the most significant capability challenges to the Army. At issue, is whether the Army should create the requisite “capacity building” means into the force and accept risk with less capacity to meet the conventional threat. An alternative option is accepting risk in reliance on soft power (CSO) capability to focus available resources on combined arms maneuver. This is but one strategic force generation dilemma facing the Army today. During a recent speech to ROTC cadets at the University of Kansas, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, states in very clear language the United States’ strategic choice and illuminates potential solutions.

Secretaries Clinton and Gates have called for more funding and more emphasis on soft power, and I could not agree with them more. In the future struggles of asymmetric counterinsurgent variety, we ought to make it a precondition of committing our troops, that we will do so only if and

when the other instruments of national power are ready to engage as well.¹⁶

What is the feasibility of leveraging CSOs as a principal soft power capability and what implications does this approach have for the Army? An examination of the attributes of Civil Society Organizations will assist understanding.

Civil Society Organizations as a Complementary Partner

Gaining an appreciation for Civil Society Organizations and their potential as a complementary strategic resource requires a brief review of their history, principal role as peace builders, culture, and institutional constraints. This knowledge will assist in framing a reasonable and more inclusive approach to unified action.

Much of what CSOs do today is a continuation of two millennia of church missionary activity. To reinforce Christ's mandate to "go into all the world and preach the good news to all creation"¹⁷ missionaries lived with indigenous peoples, provided education, established hospitals, and in general provided for physical needs. Many church based humanitarian organizations active today still aspire to this call.

The dismantling of colonial empires, the devastation of two world wars and the rise of postmodern thought all contributed to the rise of CSOs in the latter half of the 20th century. A transformed world resulting from changes brought about by two world wars fostered "... a Western consciousness about international responsibility...and, with it, international institutions like the League of Nations, United Nations, the Bretton Woods system, and now more than 4000 inter-governmental bodies were created for cross-border action."¹⁸ Changes brought about by the end of the Cold War provided even greater catalyst for CSO/NGO growth. "With the end of the Cold War there has been an explosion of international concern to respond to and resolve violent conflicts. Since

1990 private sector financial aid to CSOs/NGOs has outpaced government aid programs by almost 200%.¹⁹ So what role do Civil Society Organizations actually perform?

CSOs offer a diverse and powerful array of complementary global activities; however, it is their expertise in the area of peace building that provides a potentially powerful complementary resource that deserves thoughtful consideration by DoD planners. Peace building is a vital part of the U.S. and international strategy to combat the spread of radical ideologically motivated terrorism and is directed at those areas most likely to support its growth, the failed or failing state. It is as diverse in practice and definition as the constellation of CSOs that perform the task. “Some scholars equate peace building largely with post conflict activities for transforming relationships between groups in conflict and creating political, economic, and social institutions to manage conflict.”²⁰ Jonathan Goodhand describes peace building as preemptive activity:

Peace building is the effort to strengthen the prospects of internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. The overarching goal of peace building is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence. Ultimately peace building aims at building human security a concept that includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources and environmental security.²¹

CSO peace building efforts span a wide and diverse range of activities. They can provide dialog with high-level political actors, grass roots capacity building to end fighting, or focus efforts to build institutions at the local through national levels to resolve conflict.²² CSOs are also a leading contributor to the practical body of knowledge describing the latest peace building field research and emerging methodologies. In short, this complementary resource, the CSO, provides a unique and potentially vital

contribution to the execution U.S. foreign policy. Failure to tap into this vast reservoir of capability may prove to be an unwise strategic choice.

Regrettably, CSO culture and institutional constraints often inhibit meaningful cooperation with military efforts to achieve unity of action. Historically, cooperation between CSOs and the military has been limited to support during humanitarian assistance operations. Their importance and relevance to military theater strategic planning and execution in the current environment encompasses much more of what they do. However, in order to achieve greater harmony, it is vital that differences in culture and institutional constraints and limitations are clearly understood.

Not surprisingly, there are significant differences between Army and Civil Society Organization cultures in general. “These cultures and their accompanying biases can create road blocks to cooperation, trust and differences in dealing with human suffering.”²³ These differences become the greatest impediment to achieving harmony of effort. To overcome these potential impediments, COL Swan offers four key cultural categories to consider for achieving unified action. They are: values, organizational structure and motivations, decision-making process, and execution or implementation process.²⁴ Due to the limited scope, this study will examine only values and the decision-making process.

Civil Society Organizations and the military share many common values. “Soldiers and relief workers are innovative and resourceful and pride themselves as embodying certain values like logistical skill, courage, and endurance.... Both communities have strong can do ethics and admire perseverance and operational experience.”²⁵ Developing Army culture that embraces external organization

contributions operating harmoniously within a broad coalition of partners with unity of action is essential. That is to say DoD must be able to operate as a co-equal partner, optimizing shared values and seeking to exploit opportunities by assisting CSO capability through planning, logistics, security etc.... “Understanding these shared values is as important as understanding differences and provides a basis for trust and confidence.”²⁶ Unlike values, there is a stark contrast between military and CSO decision making.

Civil Society Organizations typically operate in a decentralized fashion. “NGOs [and CSOs] may be less constrained by orthodox thinking and by inflexible bureaucratic structures that could allow staff to engage in experimentation and adaptation in tackling development problems.”²⁷ Conversely, the military is more hierarchical. Military decision making is viewed by CSOs as “centralized and objective-driven”.²⁸ “While the military prides itself on encouraging initiative at low levels, key decisions-especially those regarding policy issues-are made only at higher levels.”²⁹ These cultural differences can and should be viewed as mutually beneficial rather than impediments to cooperation. In effect, each organization brings a unique set of complementary capabilities to the problem. Understanding organizational values, unique capabilities and cultural heritage can facilitate unity of action. Moreover, shared values are a common point of departure for understanding the pernicious influence of donor interests on CSOs. Conflicting donor agendas is a significant challenge to forming CSO military cooperation and warrants further examination.

Civil Society Organization priorities and missions are constrained by donor interests and by their need for a neutral perception by all parties. To varying degrees

this constraint may cause friction with US military, interagency and other international organizations.

Private donors are, by a wide margin, the Civil Society Organization's largest source of funding and represent a wide variety of unconnected interests. This reality presents CSOs with significant challenges and operating constraints. One overriding issue, often at odds with sustained commitment, is the quick measurable results imperative. Private and government donors have a general reluctance to invest in long term projects, preferring instead to focus on direct relief and short duration aid packages. Additional concerns over specific program objectives and funding source may constrain CSO participation. Funding related objectives may also erode CSO host nation's relationships and undermine perceived neutrality. The following excerpt from the *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations* describes the severity of this concern.

Some NGOs accept money only from private sources, fearing that the acceptance of government funding will lead to a loss of independence and pressure to compromise organizational integrity. Others accept public money but maintain an uneasy relationship with the government that provides those funds. They complain that governments put economic and political considerations ahead of humanitarian ones. They point out that a government may be giving assistance to victims of officially sanctioned violence while maintaining ties with the offending government through trade relations or even arms sales.³⁰

Funding and appearance of partiality are intrinsically connected and in many cases provide more than just a moral or ethical dilemma for Civil Society Organizations. However, in spite of these issues public funding for CSOs is still a significant part of their support. "U.S. based NGOs.... received \$1.3 billion from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and \$1.1 billion from other U.S. government sources and international organizations, making up 25 percent of the total \$9.5 billion

raised by U.S. humanitarian organizations.”³¹ Donor interest also has an indirect influence relating to media coverage.

Increased pressure to convince donors of organizational relevance may bring CSOs into direct competition with each other, the US military, and interagency and international organizations for limited media coverage. “Convincing donors that their donations are going to worthwhile causes is one reason why NGOs are conscious of generating and sustaining media attention, and why they may seek to paint a bleak picture of conditions in the crisis-torn country.”³² Understanding CSO media motivation to develop potentially divergent CSO media messaging is an important consideration for building positive CSO/military relationships.

CSOs operating in a semi-secure environment such as Afghanistan must be acutely aware of the public perception of their loyalties. This can become a dilemma for security forces operating in the same the area as CSOs. The potential negative outcome for CSOs is, in effect, a “blurring of the lines between military and humanitarian actors and a perceived loss of neutrality.”³³ The impartiality of CSOs is a critical aspect of their operating philosophy and must be considered and respected by military forces operating in the same space.

The need to harmonize security policy execution by DoD and DoS with the efforts of Civil Society Organizations is more relevant now than ever before. Moreover, this reality is further reinforced by the combination of the emerging external threat environment, the effects of a constrained budget environment, internal changes in strategic planning, and CSO linkage to national strategic policy. Gaining the value of Civil Society Organizations complementary efforts to meet the security challenges in a

unified effort requires a new approach to shaping and development operations. The remainder of this paper offers a recommended approach and some suggestions for implementation.

Unity of Action Through A Whole of Society Approach

How does DoD achieve unity of action among such diverse actors in today's complex security environment? A method for consideration in achieving unified action is the concept of creating humanitarian operating spaces through the merger of the whole of government approach with the emerging "whole of society" approach. The following section describes the whole of society approach and humanitarian operating space concept and offers three key areas to consider for facilitating harmonized action. They are: CSO inclusion in theater campaign planning, CSO integration in training and education, and development funding policy revision. Before examining these areas it is necessary to build a foundational understanding of the whole of society concept and its potential role in effectively harmonizing DoD and CSO activities.

The whole of society approach takes a more comprehensive view of relationships and organizations effecting societal interaction. It "includes international organizations and civil society as key actors operating at the top, middle and community levels."³⁴ Specifically a whole of society approach considers the integration of these key organizations and relationships vertically from the national government to local level and horizontally across each level of society. This approach depends heavily on the ability to develop social capital defined as "a sociological concept used in business, economics, organizational behavior, political science, public health and the social sciences in general to refer to connections within and between social networks."³⁵ Developing

“Social Capital” between actors and understanding the key linkages in efforts between each level is essential for harmonizing actions. For example, how are DoD or DoS programs implemented at the national level complementary to the efforts of Civil Society Organizations working at the regional or local level? Moreover, how are they linked horizontally across a common societal strata or level of governance? Coordinating development efforts with Civil Society Organizations, though a whole of society approach, will help identify complementary actions and friction between actors. Figure 1 illustrates, in basic terms, the vertical and horizontal relationships between development players and the need for social capital development.




Figure 1. Social Capital Relationships³⁶

Understanding the goals of the whole of society approach vs. the whole of government approach is instructive in gaining a reasonable expectation of what level of unity can be achieved. The goal of the whole of government approach is, in the end, to enable the execution of U.S. national security policy goals through development, diplomacy, and defense. The goal of the whole of society approach is a broader effort to develop and establish human security. Human security being defined as “the safety of individuals and communities around the world... including civilian protection, fostering stable, citizen-oriented governments with participatory democracy, human rights, and human development”.³⁷ Both sets of goals are important and one approach should not replace the other. But, it is expected that different actors operating in each framework will have mutually exclusive interests. The goal therefore is to expand areas in each approach where actions are mutually supportive and do not compromise goals or positions of each actor. Where interests and goals of each approach are complementary, there is an opportunity to create humanitarian operating space.³⁸

Developing humanitarian operating space is achieved in part by developing social capital with CSOs and the host nation to create an environment that complements basic humanitarian principles. For the purpose of this study, humanitarian operating space is defined as an ideological neutral zone where Civil Society Organizations can execute complementary actions with DoD while adhering in a practical sense to basic humanitarian principles i.e. adherence to the humanitarian imperative, independence, impartiality, neutrality, accountability and doing no harm.³⁹ As depicted in figure 2, humanitarian operating space is represented by the intersection of human security interests and U.S. national security interests. The difference depicted

by the delta between the top and bottom of the diagram represents the potential for greater unity of action between DoD and Civil Society Organizations by instituting more inclusive planning efforts, pursuing shared training and education opportunities and championing revisions in development funding legislation.




Figure 2. Humanitarian Operating Space

Three key areas to enhance the execution of development activities in a way that supports the expansion of humanitarian operating space will be further explored. First, examine planning efforts and how they can be more inclusive of Civil Society Organizations in theater campaign development. Second, explore opportunities for shared training with CSOs, and third seek to revise, through congress, development

funding methodologies and vehicles. Addressing these three areas with meaningful dialog and action will provide a significant step forward in achieving CSO / DoD harmony of effort toward generating increased humanitarian operating space.

Planning that considers and accounts for implications to CSO development activities and the need to adhere to the humanitarian principles reduces friction among actors and enhances effective collaboration and communication. Bringing CSOs into the planning process early and leveraging their unique whole of society perspective in planning not only increases unity of effort but also allows planners to develop a clearer understanding of the environment and potential problems. CSO inclusion campaign design and development planning is essential.

Civil Society Organizations can provide important input into the theater campaign design and planning process. CSO inclusion in the TCP development process could provide a means for critical information exchange, the monitoring of civil-military guidelines, conflict assessment planning, and implementation of conflict mitigation measures. As outline in a recent study by the Woodrow Wilson International Center of Scholars, USG (GCC) and CSO relationships can be beneficial. “CSOs offer policy recommendations and conflict assessment data for USG strategic level decision-making as well as operational level advice and implementation.”⁴⁰ As an example of how to facilitate planning integration, the Department of Homeland Security created the civil society consultation group. This concept could be replicated in the Geographic Combatant Commands to bring together diverse local and international CSOs that could act as a consultation group to inform and mold planning efforts.⁴¹ It is the theater

campaign plan development process that would most significantly benefit from the incorporation of such groups.

Inclusive information sharing with Civil Society Organizations can provide critical information to the theater strategic planning and execution process. Until recently the sharing of information between civilian agencies and military staffs has been difficult at best. Understanding the viability of CSOs as competent and trust worthy complementary partner is essential. This concept of information transparency is becoming more widely accepted between military entities and CSOs in disaster relief operations. The fielding and use of the All Partners Access Network (APAN) portal during the 2010 Haitian earthquake relief operation was a tremendous leap forward for CSO/NGO and military information sharing. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in support of JTF-Haiti stood up APAN as a web-based set of collaborative capabilities for unclassified information between JTF-Haiti, USG interagency, UN relief entities, and a myriad of independent CSO/NGOs.

In the first 14 days, the community of interest grew to over 1,900 users, helping responders to “connect and collaborate” with other responding organizations, improving situational awareness, and facilitating information sharing on a wide range of areas: hospital status and availability; medical and food distribution locations; status and location of seaports and airports; imagery/maps; cell phone coverage; and volunteer methods.⁴²

Information sharing with CSO can be a source for the most relevant and timely information for planning and execution.

Joint and Army training and education must reflect the growing importance of Civil Society Organizations in peace building and the need to develop the skills necessary to promote unified effort. Training and education for leaders should seek to achieve a unity of understanding between the military and CSO via shared training

experience and enhancing “common values in human security”.⁴³ Because Civil Society Organizations can operate across all levels of society and governance and therefore interact with multiple levels of the military structure, the training and education of military leaders on the role of Civil Society Organizations should include at all levels and can best be served through the wholesale inclusion of CSOs as part of the broader development team. This can be accomplished through the integration of CSO operations into all facets of leader education and training and the employment of key broadening opportunities. The following discussion offers some thoughts on the changes necessary to effectively influence and improve military and Civil Society Organization cross cultural cooperation

Institutional education programs should include Civil Society Organization personnel and offer CSO related broadening opportunities to military leadership. Developing a deliberate plan to expand career specialty institutional training courses such as military logistics, communications, and engineering is a first step toward developing a new generation of military and CSO leadership.⁴⁴ Additionally, the Army should fund senior CSO leadership at the appropriate levels to attend mid and senior level professional education (e.g. Intermediate Leader Education (ILE), and the Senior Service College) with an emphasis on understanding the strategic implications of Civil Society Organization complementary actions and their value in joint campaign design and planning. Lastly, offering broadening opportunities for key billets would be beneficial. For example, “establishing a training program enabling appropriate military personnel to train with leading relief-oriented NGOs for six to 12 months... modeled after Training With Industry programs. The focus of these programs would be CA

personnel, foreign area specialists, logisticians, transportation specialists and medical personnel.”⁴⁵

Military training outside the institutional domain must also change. Civil Society Organization participation should be incorporated into the full range of training venues from Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) level joint exercises to Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level training conducted at the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Including CSOs in the CTC scenarios and or attaching CSO representatives to military units during CTC rotations provides an opportunity for CSOs and BCT staffs to gain a better appreciation of how to effectively harmonize planning efforts and information sharing at the tactical level. Geographic Combatant Command and Joint Task Force staff training exercises offer a rich venue for building good relationships between Civil Society Organizations and strategic/operational level military staff organizations. Inclusion of CSOs in key exercises would also further reinforce the development of mutual values of human security and enhance mutual understanding of the operating environment and problems therein. Such exercises are executed yearly as part of the joint training program and include: Austere Challenge at European Command, Blue Advance at Southern Command, Terminal Fury at Pacific Command, Judicious Response at Africa Command, and Unified Endeavor for rotating JTF staffs supporting Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These efforts would also reinforce the current positive inroads already established at Geographic Combatant Command staffs with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The last area for consideration is that of development funding.

Changes in development funding authorities would enhance CSO and DoD unified action. The CJCS in his 2011 guidance reinforces this point stating that “the laws and regulations surrounding security assistance are one of the major barriers to better and more substantial partnerships and a pooled-resource approach to foreign assistance”.⁴⁶ Funding vehicles should be modified to enhance unity of action between U.S. Government, International and private donor funded development activities. In addition, focus development funding on long range sustainable programs rather than short term aid investments.

The first challenge in the process is aligning funding objectives. Government funding sources and associated policy implications often present Civil Society Organizations with a significant dilemma. Asking CSOs to implement development programs with government funding generates a problem of balancing need for resources and adherence to humanitarian principles in fostering human security, which they perceive as essential to their security and access to local populations.⁴⁷ Funding policy requires the alignment of, to the greatest degree possible, donor interests and U.S. government objectives keeping in mind the balance between national security goals and human security goals. Funding policy makers must also consider the reevaluation and enforcement of adequate UN and US regulatory policy necessary to guard against the proliferation of corruption and market damaging practices that run counter to development goals. A step toward this goal might be a combination of focused incentivizing of private donor funding, a reevaluation of U.S. development funding policy goals and regulation of development resources provided by international donor funds. In addition funding “should be suitably flexible to foster local

sustainability”⁴⁸ U.S. development programs focusing on local organizations administered by local entities where practical rather than large international contractors should be considered. Each of these efforts should consider funding vehicles and approaches that can best facilitate and enhance the mutual interests of the whole of government and whole of society approaches.

Conclusion

Integrating the whole of society approach into strategic planning and execution enables unity of action with Civil Society Organizations and their valuable complementary efforts and expertise. Harmonizing development efforts with Civil Society Organizations through a whole of society approach capitalizes on emerging opportunities while enhancing the U.S. government’s ability to meet the security challenges of a rapidly changing strategic environment.

Presented with an asymmetric and persistent threat of terrorism bred in environments of instability that will tax decreasing USG resources reinforces the need for achieving unified action with unconventional actors such as Civil Society Organizations. Furthermore, the emergence of a more inclusive and comprehensive “design” based approach to planning provide an increased utility in aggressively seeking Civil Society Organizations as a complementary strategic partner. To achieve unity of action with CSOs the Department of Defense should conduct strategic and theater level planning and execution using a whole of society approach. “The ongoing shifts in relative power and increasing interconnectedness in the international order indicate a strategic inflection point. This requires America’s foreign policy to employ an adaptive blend of diplomacy, development, and defense.” ⁴⁹

Blending whole of government and whole of society approaches in development planning and execution at the strategic and operational levels will more effectively harmonize the powerful complementary capabilities that Civil Society Organizations have to offer. “By operating hand-in-hand with allies and partners, supporting the interagency, and working with outside organizations, we will provide the Nation with the security the Constitution guarantees.”⁵⁰ Armed with a clearer understanding of these organizations and the whole of society approach, DoD can achieve greater unified action with these valuable and capable partners.

Endnotes

¹ Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Davis, and Lee Wight, “Death of Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (1st Quarter 2009): 1

² United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2010*, (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Futures Group, February 18, 2010), 4.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Susan Rice, “U.S. Foreign Assistance and Failed States,” *Brookings Institute Online*, November, 1, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2002/1125poverty_rice.aspx (accessed September 29, 2010)

⁵ U.S. Joint Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Staff, May 2, 2007 Incorporating Change, March 20, 2009), II-2.

⁶ Barak, Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 26.

⁷ United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2010*, (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Futures Group, February 18, 2010), 52.

⁸ Ibid., 53.

⁹ Jim Garamone, “Gates Calls for Significant Cuts in Defense Overhead,” May 8, 2010, linked from *The Department of Defense Home Page*, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59082> (accessed December 9, 2010).

¹⁰ Gary Luck and Mike Findley, *Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices*, 2nd Edition, (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, July, 2008), 27.

¹¹“Civil Society and the U.S. Government in Conflict-Affected Regions: Building Better Relationships for Peace building,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (August 2010): 5.

¹² Obama, *National Security Strategy*, 27.

¹³ Admiral Michael Mullen, *The Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: February 2011), 1.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ General Martin E. Dempsey, interview by J. Brit McCarley, July 9, 2010.

¹⁶ Admiral Michael Mullen, CJCS, “Kansas State University, Landon Lecture Series, Manhattan, KS, 2010

¹⁷ Mark 16:15 (New International Study Bible)

¹⁸ Deborah Eade and Ernst Ligteringren, eds., *Debating Development* (London, UK: Oxfam, GB, 2001), 21.

¹⁹ Jonathan Goodhand, *Aiding Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 1.

²⁰ Craig Zelizer and Robert A. Rubinstein, *Building Peace Practical Reflections from the Field*, (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2009), 2.

²¹ Goodhand, *Aiding Peace*, 12.

²² Zelizer and Rubinstein, *Building Peace Practical Reflections from the Field*, 1.

²³ COL Guy C. Swan, “Bridging the Nongovernmental Organization-Military Gap,” *Military Review*, September-October 1996, 30.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 31.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ David Lewis and Tina Wallace, eds., *New Roles and Relevance Development NGOs and the Challenge of Change* (Bloomington, CT: Kumarian Press, 2000), 11.

²⁸ Swan, “Bridging the Nongovernmental Organization-Military Gap”, 32.

²⁹ Ibid., 33.

³⁰ Pamela R. Aall, Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas G. White, *Guide to IGOs NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000), 99.

³¹ Ibid., 100.

³² Ibid.

³³ Goodhand, *Aiding Peace*, 104.

³⁴ Lisa Schirch, *Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security* (Harrisonburg, VA: Eastern Mennonite University 3D Security Initiative, 2010), 4.

³⁵ Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital (accessed January 13, 2011).

³⁶ *Special Report Civil Society and the U.S. Government in Conflict-Affected Regions: Building Better Relationships for Peace building* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 2010), 3.

³⁷ Schirch, *Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security*, 3.

³⁸ Ibid, 7.

³⁹ “Humanitarian Imperative: to save lives, alleviate suffering, and uphold democracy. Independence: to make decisions, program plans, and strategies free from political goals. Impartiality: to provide resources regardless of the identity of those suffering. Neutrality: to not take sides in political or military struggles. Do no harm: to avoid harming others intentionally or unintentionally. Accountability: to consult and be accountable to local people and long term sustainability, Schirch, *Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security*, 3.

⁴⁰ *Special Report Civil Society and the U.S. Government in Conflict-Affected Regions: Building Better Relationships for Peace building*, 2.

⁴¹ Schirch, *Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security*, 8.

⁴² Ricardo Arias, “Beyond Command and Control: USSOUTHCOM’s Use of Social Networking to Connect and Collaborate,” *Air Land Sea Bulletin*, Issue No. 2011-1 (January 2011): 23.

⁴³ Schirch, *Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security*, 8.

⁴⁴ Swan, “Bridging the Nongovernmental Organization-Military Gap”, 33.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Admiral Michael Mullen, “CJCS Guidance for 2011,” Memorandum for Joint Staff and Joint Force, Washington, DC., 6.

⁴⁷ Schirch, *Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human Security*, 8.

⁴⁸ *Special Report Civil Society and the U.S. Government in Conflict-Affected Regions: Building Better Relationships for Peace building*, 6.

⁴⁹ Mullen, *The Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1.

⁵⁰ Mullen, “CJCS Guidance for 2011,” 7.